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Abstract
For a model developed in a companion paper, we investigate how adap-
tive dynamics might have led to the Bayesian equilibrium found. In an ap-
pendix, we also explain from a dynamic viewpoint a lack of equilibrium in a
closely related model also invesitgated in the companion paper.
1 Introduction
Ever since Darwin, biologists interested in evolutionary biology have been puzzled
by the “handicap paradox”, i.e. the fact that secondary sexual characters, most
often in males, that clearly attract females, be so exceedingly developed as to be
a threat to the male’s viability. To (over-)simplify, two mechanisms have been
proposed to explain that state of affairs. One is due to Fisher [6], made into a
mathematical model by Lande [10]. It is known as the “Fisher runaway”. The
other one, indeed much simpler, was originally proposed by Zahavi [13], and was
made into a mathematical model by Grafen [9, 8]. It is known as the “handicap
principle”.
A notable difference is that while Fisher’s runaway is a dynamical model, ex-
hibiting a divergence as time goes to infinity, Zahavi’s handicap principle describes
an equilibrium, and does not say how the dynamics of evolution may have reached
that equilibrium. Grafen’s article [9] does contain a dynamic argument, but only
in the neighborhood of the equilibrium to show its stability. (Moreover, Siller [12]
has invalidated part of the dynamic argument of [9].)
In the article [1], we emphasize the exact nature of the equilibrium of the hand-
icap paradox: a bayesian equilibrium of signaling theory, where males of different
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“qualities” signal their qualities via the secondary sexual character of interest to
identical females to induce them into accepting to mate with them. In this equilib-
rium the performance indices are measures of the resulting fitness of the players,
or a reasonable proxy of it: the expected quality of her mate for a female, and his
expected number of matings for a male. Then we investigate two variants of each
of two models of sexual selection directly inspired by Grafen’s model [9], and in a
lesser extent by Getty [7]. All four variants yield closed form bayesian equilibria.
The models themselves are partly dynamical, because the behaviour of males and
females depend on the time of the year, but it is an equilibrium that we compute.
And because a bayesian equilibrium is a rather involved concept, it is not a priori
clear how evolution may have reached it.
Our aim in this article is to provide one plausible explanation of how the dy-
namics of adaptation may have reached the signaling bayesian equilibrium. This is
the more interesting that there actually are two bayesian equilibria in our models,
one where no signaling occurs and one with a large signaling reminiscent of the
observed extravagant ornaments of males of certain species.
We shall focus on the model that we deem the most interesting of all four: the
“additive signaling cost” model with zero minimal male quality, and scarcity of the
females as the limiting factor for the males. Concerning the “multiplicative signal-
ing cost model” of [1], we shall only give in the appendix a dynamical explanation
of an undesirable feature also found in [9].
2 The model
2.1 General description
We recall here our “additive” model and the equilibria we found. For a discus-
sion of the underlying hypotheses and the validity of the models, and also of the
implications of our solutions, we refer the reader to [1].
There is a short breeding season of length T each year, and we call t ∈ [0, T ]
the time elapsed within the breeding season.
There is a fixed numberN♂ of males. The fitness of each is taken to be propor-
tional to the number of matings he achieves over his life time. All have a potential
reproduction rate large enough that they are only limited in their number of mat-
ings each season by the availability of females and the willingness of the females
they meet to mate with them.
Each male has a quality q statistically uniformly distributed over [0, q1] ⊂ R+.
1
1We could, without loss of generality, normalize q1 = 1, taking the life expectancy of a best male
that would not signal as the unit of time. For a non-unit q1, the fitness F♀ and F♂, the females’
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Each displays a signal s ∈ [0, q], “chosen” according to a strategy s = ψ♂(q).
Except for their quality, all males are identical and share the same strategy. The
fecund life expectancy L♂ of a male linearly increases with q, but decreases with
the signal. (This last fact is the manifestation of the handicap principle. It is not
hypothesized a priori, but we show in [1] under which hypotheses it is a necessary
feature of the bayesian equilibrium.) More specifically, we assume thatL♂ = q−s.
There is a fixed number N♀(0) of females at the begining of each breeding
season. All females are identical. They mate only once during any breeding season.
We take as a proxy of their fitness the expectation of the quality of the male they
will eventually mate with. Hence they have a benefit in choosing a high quality
male as a mate. This in turn puts a selective pressure on males to signal their
quality q. Females cannot observe the quality of the males they meet, but only their
signals. They accept a given male with a probability m = ψ♀(s, t), depending on
the male’s signal and the time during the breeding season.
Once a female has mated, she leaves the pool of available females, causing the
number n♀ of available females and its expectation En♀ = N♀ to decrease, and
thus the operational sex ratio ω = N♂/n♀ to increase, during the breeding season.
Females meet fecund males in a Poisson process with a fixed intensity λ, while
males meet females in a Poisson process with intensity µ. Since any such meeting
involves one male and one female, one necessarily has N♂µ = n♀λ, hence µ
decreases according to µ(t) = λ/ω(t).
We recapitulate the notation in Table 1.
2.2 The bayesian equilibrium: concept and notation
We are looking for a stable strategy pair (s = ψ⋆
♂
(q), m = ψ⋆♀(s, t)). What “sta-
ble” means is the object of signaling theory. Its concept of bayesian equilibrium
simplifies here, for this “pure signaling game”, (the signal is exactly observed by
the females and does not directly impact their fitness) in the following way. (We
shall use super stars to denote equilibrium strategies.)
The uninformed player, here the females, forms a conjecture χ about the males’
strategy, meaning that they conjecture, some s = χ(q). If at equilibrium this con-
jecture is strictly monotonic (here increasing), the equilibrium is said to be sepa-
rating. In that case, the females can conjecture q = χ−1(s), and choose a strategy
ψ̂♀(q, t) and play m = ψ♀(s, t) = ψ̂♀(χ
−1(s), t). A bayesian equilibrium, is one
where ψ⋆
♂
is optimal against (χ, ψ̂♀), ψ̂♀ is optimal against ψ
⋆
♂
, and χ = ψ⋆
♂
:
threshold θ and the males’ strategies ψ♂ would just be multiplied by q1. We do not do that to keep
better track of the dimension of the variables involved.
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T Length of the breeding season each year.
t Time elapsed within a breeding season.
q Male’s quality.
q1 Maximum male quality.
s Male’s signal.
ψ♂ Males’ strategy, giving s = ψ♂(q).
L♂ Male’s life expectancy (in years). We have assumed L♂ = q − s.
m Female’s probability to accept to mate with a male encountered.
ψ♀ Females’ strategy givingm = ψ♀(s, t).
N♂ Number of males (fixed).
n♀ Number of available females (decreasing with t).
N♀ Mathematical expectation En♀.
ω Operating sex ratio N♂/n♀.
λ Intensity of the Poisson process of females meeting males
µ Intensity of the Poisson process of males meeting available females.
Q(t) Expected q of her future mate for a female who has not yet mated at time t.
tm Time at which a male of a given quality
becomes “acceptable” by the females.
Nm Male’s expected number of matings per breeding season. (Function of s.)
It is convenient to use the dimensionless parameters
k k = 2/(λT ).
τ τ = (T − t)/T .
τm τm = (T − tm)/T .
Table 1: The main notation used in the model
Definition 1 A separating bayesian equilibrium is a pair (ψ⋆
♂
, ψ⋆♀) such that
ψ⋆♀(s, t) = ψ̂♀((ψ
⋆
♂
)−1(s), t) , (1)
where the pair (ψ⋆
♂
, ψ̂♀) is a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game.
Of course, this is a construction of thought. Females are not assumed to actually
“conjecture” anything, and equation (1) should be seen as a useful representation
of the equilibrium strategy.
In our model, the bayesian equilibrium is a slight deviation from the above
definition, in that ψ⋆
♂
is not strictly increasing, but yet, it provides all the needed
information on q for the females to determine their optimal behaviour.
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2.3 Females’ behaviour
It turns out that there is a separating bayesian equilibrium, meaning that at equilib-
rium, females exactly infer males’ quality from their signal. They adopt a threshold
policy where a male is accepted if his quality is larger than the expected quality
Q⋆(t) of their future mate if they have not yet mated at that time.
We show in [1] that Q⋆(t) obeys the differential equation
Q˙+ λEmax{q −Q, 0} = 0 , Q(T ) = 0 .
the solution of which is given by
Q⋆(t) = q1
T − t
(k + 1)T − t
. (2)
The a priori expected quality of her mate for any female at equilibrium is thus:
Q⋆0 = Q
⋆(0) =
q1
k + 1
. (3)
The females conjecture as to the males’ strategy is s = χ(q), with χ(0) = 0.
Then the threshold strategy translates into
θ⋆(t) = χ(Q⋆(t))
and
m = ψ⋆♀(s, t) :=
{
0 if s < θ⋆(t) ,
1 if s ≥ θ⋆(t) .
(4)
2.4 Males’ strategy
2.4.1 Mating opportunities
It follows that a male with a signal s mates no earlier than a time tm given by
τm :=
T − tm
T
=

1 if χ−1(s) ≥ Q⋆0 ,
k
χ−1(s)
q1 − χ−1(s)
if χ−1(s) ≤ Q⋆0 .
(5)
We assume that the potential reproduction rate of all males is large enough, so that
the limiting factor in their number of matings is the scarcity of available and willing
females. Females dynamics as outlined above imply that the expected number of
available females at any time during the breeding season is (see [1])
N♀(t) = N♀(0)
(
(k + 1)T − t
(k + 1)T
)2
. (6)
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The expected rate of males meeting available females is Eµ(t) = λN♀(t)/N♂ =
µ0N♀(t)/N♀(0). The expected number of matings per breeding season for a male
is the integral of Eµ from tm to T , i.e.
Nm(s) =
K
3
[(
q1
q1 − χ−1(s)
)3
− 1
]
, (7)
withK = µ0Tk
3/(k + 1)2.
2.4.2 Males’ strategies
The males fitness function is given by
F♂ = F̂♂(q, s) =
K
3
(q − s)
[(
q1
q1 − χ−1(s)
)3
− 1
]
. (8)
Equations (5) and (8) show that for χ−1(s) > Q0, F̂♂ is strictly decreasing in s,
so that there is no incentive for such a male to advertise with a signal larger than
for χ−1(s) = Q0. For smaller qualities, we differentiate F̂♂(q, s) with respect
to s and equate to zero. At the bayesian equilibrium, χ = ψ♂, and this yields a
differential equation for ψ♂, specifically
ψ′
♂
(q) = q31
q − ψ♂(q)
q(q1 − q)(q21 − q1q +
q2
3
)
, ψ♂(0) = 0 . (9)
We show in [1] that the differential equation (9) has a closed form solution Ψ(·):
Ψ(q) = q1
27q51q + 18q
4
1q
2 + 9q31q
3 + 3q21q
4 − q6
2(27q6
1
+ q6)
(10)
leading to the equilibrium strategy
ψ⋆
♂
(q) =

Ψ(q) if q ≤
q1
k + 1
,
Ψ
(
q1
k + 1
)
if q ≥
q1
k + 1
.
(11)
3 Evolutionary dynamics
3.1 Fundamental hypothesis
We formulate here an hypothesis which seems reasonable, and greatly simplifies
the investigation of the evolutionary dynamics, in effect uncoupling the males and
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females dynamics. It is based upon the remark that the females’ trait of interest is
a behavioural trait, which may evolve essentially as an ecological character, while
the males’ trait is a physical trait, evolving as a genetic character.
Hypothesis 1 The dynamics of evolution of the females’ behaviour is much faster
than that of the males’ signaling strategy.
As a consequence, using Kolmogorov’s theorem, if the females’ behaviour dy-
namics turn out to be stable, we may investigate them with a constant males’ strat-
egy, and the males’ strategy dynamics may be investigated with χ = ψ♂, which
will prove to be the limit χ.
3.2 Females’ behavioural “fast” dynamics
The fitness of a female does not depend, in our model, on the behaviour of her
conspecifics, so that essentially any evolutionary dynamics are simple gradient dy-
namics. Assuming it is essentially an ecological process, we call u the ecological
time.
3.2.1 General strategy
We assume that the females adopt a strategy ψ♀(s, t). It may have been constructed
as some ψ¯♀(χ
−1(s), t)with some conjecture χ. Now, before reaching the bayesian
equilibrium, if ever, χ is different from ψ♂ and ψ¯♀ is different from the equilibrium
strategy ψ̂♀. Recall, though, that now ψ♂ is assumed fixed. We may set
ψ˜♀(q, t) = ψ♀(ψ♂(q), t) .
This is the strategy that a female happens to play.
In both cases, we use the expected quality Q(t) of her future mate for a female
which has not yet mated at time t. Let a ∈ {0, 1} be the random boolean variable
describing the choice of a female meeting a male, a = 1 for “accept” to mate. With
P(a = 1) = E(a) = m. One has :
Q(t) = λdtE(aq) + (1− λdtEa)Q(t+ dt) , Q(T ) = 0 .
Taking the limit as dt→ 0, we obtain
dQ
dt
= −λE[a(q −Q(t))] , Q(T ) = 0 . (12)
We consider two cases, depending on whether females use a mixed strategy,
with m ∈ [0, 1], or whether they use a threshold strategy, with m ∈ {0, 1}, more
specificallym = 1 if s ≥ θ(t) for some time dependent threshold θ(t).
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3.2.2 Mixed strategies
In this case, each female adopts a mixed strategy, i.e. she randomizes a, choosing
its probabilitym = ψ˜♀(q, t) of being 1, which is also its expected value, and with
a − m independent from q, as is customary for a mixed strategy. It follows that
E[(a−m)q] = E(a−m)Eq = 0. Therefore
E(aq) = E(mq) =
∫ q1
0
ψ˜♀(q, t)
qdq
q1
.
Now, Q obeys the differential equation
dQ
dt
= −λE[ψ˜♀(q, t)(q −Q)] . (13)
Let DQ(t) be the Fre´chet derivative of Q(t) with respect to ψ˜♀. We evaluate
the variation δQ(t) = 〈DQ(t), δψ˜♀〉 for a given variation δψ˜♀. It satisfies:
dδQ
dt
= λEψ˜♀(q, t)δQ− λ
∫ q1
0
δψ˜♀(q, t)(q −Q)
dq
q1
,
The first variation of the females’ fitness is therefore obtained as a function of
h(v, u) = exp
(
λ
∫ v
u
Eψ˜♀(q, t) dt
)
as
δQ(0) = λ
∫ T
0
∫ q1
0
h(0, t)δψ˜♀(q, t)(q −Q(t))
dq
q1
dt , (14)
exhibiting the gradient at q as the function t 7→ h(0, t)(q −Q(t)).
LetM be the positive mutation intensity factor (see [2]). Finally, the adaptive
dynamics are just
dψ˜♀(q, t)
du
=

[Mh(0, t)(q −Q(t))]− if ψ˜♀(q, t) = 1 ,
Mh(0, t)(q −Q(t)) if ψ˜♀(q, t) ∈ (0, 1) ,
[Mh(0, t)(q −Q(t))]+ if ψ˜♀(q, t) = 0 .
They lead to
d
dt
(
dQ(t)
du
)
= λE[ψ˜♀(q, t)]
dQ(t)
du
− λh(0, t)E[M(q −Q(t))2]
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if dψ˜♀/du 6= 0, with
dQ
du
(T ) = 0 .
Now, the semi-group h(·, ·) is positive. Hence dQ(t)/du > 0, pointing to a con-
stantly increasing Q(t). But Q(t) is bounded above by Q⋆(t). Therefore Q(t)
converges, uniformly according to Dini’s theorem, to some Q̂(t), and ψ˜♀(q, t) con-
verges to
ψ˜♀(q, t) =
{
0 if q < Q̂(t) ,
1 if q ≥ Q̂(t) .
(15)
Because of the continuity of the solution of an ordinary differential equation with
respect to its right-hand side, it follows that Q̂(t) = Q⋆(t), and the limiting strategy
(15) coincides with the equilibrium strategy
ψ⋆♀(s, t) =
{
0 if s < ψ♂(Q
⋆(t)) ,
1 if s ≥ ψ♂(Q
⋆(t)) .
3.2.3 Threshold strategy
We now consider the case where the females’ strategy evolves from the start as a
threshold strategy. Let it be
ψ♀(s, t) =
{
0 if s < θ(t) ,
1 if s ≥ θ(t) .
We set qˇ(t) = ψ−1
♂
(θ(t)), so that the same strategy can be expressed as
ψ˜♀(q, t) =
{
0 if q < qˇ(t) ,
1 if q ≥ qˇ(t) .
In equation (12), we now have a = 1 if q ≥ qˇ, and E(aq) = EaE(q | a = 1), i.e.
E(aq) = P(q ≥ qˇ)E(q | q ≥ qˇ). The expected mate’s quality now obeys
dQ
dt
= −λdt
(
q1 − qˇ
q1
)(
q1 + qˇ
2
−Q
)
, Q(T ) = 0 .
We compute its gradient with respect to qˇ(·). Let δQ(t) = 〈DQ(t), δqˇ〉. It obeys
dδQ
dt
= λ
q1 − qˇ
q1
δQ−
λq1
q1
(Q− qˇ)δqˇ , δQ(T ) = 0 .
Let
g(v, u) = exp
(
λ
∫ v
u
q1 − qˇ(t)
q1
dt
)
.
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We obtain
δQ(0) = λ
∫ T
0
g(0, t)(Q(t)− qˇ(t)) dt .
Thus, the gradient is of the sign of Q− qˇ. We conclude as above that the adaptive
dynamics
dqˇ(t)
du
=Mg(0, t)(Q(t)− qˇ(t))
makeQ(t) converge monotonically, hence uniformly, towardQ⋆(t)while the thresh-
old qˇ converges toward qˇ(t) = Q⋆(t) for all t, and that this generates the same
equilibrium strategy as previously. We have therefore proved the following:
Theorem 1 Whether they use mixed strategies or threshold strategies, the females’
behaviour converges toward the signaling equilibrium threshold strategy.
Therefore, in the limit, females behave as if they were making the right conjecture
about the males’ strategy.
3.3 Males’ strategic “slow” dynamics
3.3.1 Adaptive dynamics
It follows from the hypothesis 1 and from the previous subsection that we may
investigate the males’ strategy dynamics as if χ = ψ♂ and the females use the
threshold q = Q⋆. Let v denote evolutionary time.
For lack of a better choice, we shall make use of the adaptive dynamics ap-
proach (see [2]), although it has been completely justified [11, 5, 3] in the case of
clonal reproduction, while we investigate sexual behaviour. One possible hypothe-
sis to better fit the theoretical framework of adaptive dynamics would be to assume
that the trait considered is inherited from the father only (say on the Y chromo-
some of mammals, but this does not account for birds). But we do not wish to
insist on this justification, simply taking adaptive dynamics for a plausible descrip-
tion of evolution. In so doing, we shall also assume that the mutation intensity is
independent of the quality.
Let ψ♂ be the resident strategy among males. At equilibrium, thus, χ = ψ♂.
Assume a mutation produces a small deviation away from that strategy in some
males. The fitness of the mutants depends on the resident strategy through the fe-
males’ behaviour according to their “conjecture” χ = ψ♂. If this fitness is larger
than the resident’s, this strategy will invade and, with the males’ population dy-
namics, replace the resident strategy. Then the females’ behaviour will adapt again.
Accordingly, the dynamics of the trait ψ♂(·)will be obtained by taking the gradient
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of the males’ fitness with respect to the signal, assuming the females’ conjecture
χ(·) fixed at the resident value of ψ♂(·).
Since this trait is function valued, this will yield a partial differential equation,
as emphasized in [4]. As compared to the treatment there, beyond the mathematical
difficulties2 raised by the definition of their σ2(q′, q), in such a general framework
as ours we have no ground to postulate a specific cross-correlation between dif-
ferent values of q. Therefore, we neglect any such effect and choose to ignore it,
or, equivalently, set σ2(q′, q) = δ(q − q′). (Note that this is essentially what the
authors do in the examples provided in the article.)
3.3.2 Mathematical analysis
According to the above analysis, we differentiate F♂(q, s, ψ
⋆
♀(s)) with respect to
s assuming χ(·) fixed at χ = ψ♂. Call v the evolutionary time, and denote ψ
′
♂
=
∂ψ♂(q, v)/∂q. Assume a constant mutation factorM . We obtain
∂ψ♂(q, v)
∂v
=
KM
(q1 − q)3
[
q31
q − ψ♂
(q1 − q)ψ′♂
− q21q + q1q
2 −
q3
3
]
. (16)
The problem now is to investigate the asymptotic behaviour of the solution of this
partial differential equation (PDE) as v goes to infinity, for any positive, supposedly
small, initial condition ψ♂(q, 0), and for q ∈ [0, Q0].
We were not able to prove conclusively its convergence toward the equilibrium
strategy. However it is clear that it does in view of the following development.
We claim:
Theorem 2 In equation (16), let ψ♂(0, 0) = 0, p0 ∈ (0, 1/2) and, ∀q ∈ [0, Q
⋆
0],
ψ′
♂
(q, 0) ∈ [p0, 1/2]. Then, if ψ♂(·, v) converges in that range as v → ∞, it is
toward Ψ, given by equation (10).
Proof Note first the following:
Proposition 1 If the solution of (16) converges for q ∈ [0, Q⋆0] as v → ∞, it
is either toward the trivial equilibrium ψ♂(·,∞) = 0 or toward the signalling
equilibrium solution ψ♂(·,∞) = Ψ(·) (10).
Proof Indeed, for any limit, the right-hand side of (16) must be either zero, mean-
ing that ψ♂(·,∞) = Ψ(·), or indeterminate, which happens only on the trivial
equilibrium solution ψ♂(q) = 0.
2The fact that x and x′ in equation (2) of [4] belong to a Banach space makes it very difficult
to give a meaning to M(x′, x) and to the integral: the symbol dx′ cannot stand for the Lebesgue
measure which does not exist in a Banach space.
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Lemma 1 Under the hypotheses of the theorem, the solution of equation (16) can-
not converge to ψ♂(q) = 0.
Proof We write the equations of the characteristic curves of equation (16), using
the classic notation ψ′
♂
= p. They read
dq
dv
= KMq31
q − ψ♂
p2(q1 − q)4
, (17)
dψ♂
dv
= KM
1
(q1 − q)3
(
2q31
q − ψ♂
p(q1 − q)
− q21q + q1q
2 −
q3
3
)
, (18)
dp
dv
= KM
q31
(q1 − q)4
(
4
q − ψ♂
p(q1 − q)
+
1
p
− 2
)
. (19)
Note that q(v) = 0, ψ♂(q(v)) = 0 is a characteristic curve. Then, we claim:
Proposition 2 The solution of (16) satisfies for all q ∈ [0, Q⋆0], ψ♂(q, v) < q.
Proof It follows from equations (17) and (18) that (we denote with a dot differen-
tiation with respect to v)
(q − ψ♂)
· =
KMq31
(q1 − q)3
(
1− 2p
p2(q1 − q)
(q − ψ♂) +
q
q1
−
q2
q2
1
+
q3
3q3
1
)
,
with q(0) − ψ♂(q(0), 0) > 0. Because q/q1 < 1, the last three terms in the right
hand side above add to a positive value. Let a(v) = KMq31(1−2p)/(p
2(q1−q)
4).
By the theorem of comparison of the solutions of ordinary differential equations,
we have q−ψ♂(q, v) > y(v)where y(v) is the solution of the differential equation
y˙ = a(v)y , y(0) = q(0)− ψ♂(q(0), 0) > 0 ,
as long as q < Q⋆0 < q1. Therefore y(v) remains positive for all relevant v, proving
the proposition.
Proposition 3 The characteristic curves fill a neighborhood of the v axis in the
(v, q) plane.
Proof To use the local surjectivity theorem, check that the differential
δq(v) =
dq(v)
dq(0)
δq(0) +
dq(v)
dψ♂(0)
δψ♂(0, 0)
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remains positive for all v, provided that δq(0)− δψ♂(0, 0) > 0. This last inequal-
ity and the previous proposition guarantee that the differentials satisfy δq(v) −
δψ♂(0, v) > 0, driving the variational equation
δq˙(v) =
1
p2(v)
(δq(v)− δψ♂(0, v)) , δq(0) > 0 ,
to positive values.
We now prove the lemma. Indeed, the characteristic equation for p along the
characteristic q(v) = 0, ψ♂(0, v) = 0 is
p˙ =
KM
q1
(
1
p
− 2
)
. (20)
Hence, as long as p < 1/2, it is increasing. Hence for all v, p(v) > p0. By
continuity, there is a neighborhood of the v axis of the (v, q) plane where p(v) >
p0/2. Hence in that neighborhood ψ♂(q, v) ≥ p0q/2, forbidding a convergence of
ψ♂(q, v) toward zero. This proves the lemma, and together with proposition 1, the
theorem.
3.3.3 Further evidence
We have not conclusively proved that for all q ∈ [0, Q⋆0], the solution ψ♂(q, v) of
equation (16) converges toward Ψ(q), solution of ∂ψ♂(q, v)/∂v = 0, i.e. toward
Ψ(q). Yet we offer two other indications.
On the characteristic curve q(v) = 0, ψ♂(0, v) = 0, p(v) is governed by
equation (20), from which it follows that p(v) → 1/2 = dΨ/dq(0). Moreover,
we were able to prove mathematically that the second derivative (∂2ψ♂/∂q
2)(0)
converges to 2/3, the second derivative of ψ⋆
♂
.
More convincingly, we used the characteristic equations (thus getting around
a severe numerical instability of the finite difference method) with a Runge Kutta
method of order 4 to integrate equation (16) from ψ♂(q, 0) = 0.1q, obtaining
numerical approximations of ψ♂(q, v) for various values of v. Using q1 = 1, and
arbitrarily,KM = 10−3, the results up to v = 1000 appear in Table 2 together with
ψ⋆
♂
. For v = 1500, the difference with ψ⋆
♂
is below 5× 10−5. The precision of the
approximation of ψ⋆
♂
is the more striking that the characteristic curves themselves
do not stabilize as v →∞.
Figure 1 shows the graphs of ψ♂(q, v) for various values of v. The graph for
v = 1000 is indistinguishable from that of ψ⋆
♂
.
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q v = 0 v = 5 v = 10 v = 100 v = 1000 ψ⋆
♂
0, 1 0, 01 0, 0145 0, 0175 0, 0370 0, 0533 0, 0535
0, 2 0, 02 0, 0322 0, 0395 0, 0833 0, 1144 0, 1148
0, 3 0, 03 0, 0550 0, 0684 0, 1420 0, 1846 0, 1849
0, 4 0, 04 0, 0859 0, 1079 0, 2167 0, 2650 0, 2653
0, 5 0, 05 0, 1303 0, 1644 0, 3113 0, 3570 0, 3571
0, 6 0, 06 0, 1987 0, 2498 0, 4274 0, 4614 0, 4615
0, 7 0, 07 0, 3140 0, 3855 0, 5610 0, 5791 0, 5791
0, 8 0, 08 0, 5188 0, 5975 0, 7038 0, 7097 0, 7097
Table 2: Numerical values of ψ♂(q, v) obtained with the method of characteristics,
and a fourth order Runge Kutta integration scheme and a fixed step size of 1.
4 Conclusion
Our analysis is entirely dependent on our hypothesis of separation of time scales
between the dynamics of behavioural adaptation of females and that of physical
evolution of males.
Under that hypothesis, the natural evolutionary dynamics of the females’ be-
haviour converge toward the signalling equilibrium behaviour under two hypothe-
ses on the nature of this behaviour during adaptation : mixed strategy or threshold
strategy. That is, in the limit, females behave as if they had conjectured the right
strategy of males.
Concerning the males, we feel that we have shown that indeed, for the model
of sexual selection emphasized here, adaptive dynamics do converge toward the
signaling equilibrium we have analyzed in our previous article [1].
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A Appendix: Multiplicative model
In our article [1], we investigated another model 3, closer to Grafen’s, that we called
“multiplicative” (as opposed to the “additive” model investigated here) where we
called σ a dimensionless signal, and assume L♂ = q(1 − σ). We concluded that
that model is less satisfactory on two counts. On the one hand, it yields an exces-
sively large equilibrium signal, and thus an exceedingly small residual survivorship
at equilibrium, and, on the other hand, in that model it is not possible to let q range
over (0, q1] as we did here. One has to assume a positive minimum q0. As q0 ap-
proaches zero, the equilibrium male signaling strategy goes to 1 for all positive q,
an absurd conclusion. Yet, as low quality males may die before reaching adulthood,
there is no reason why the adult life expectancy could not be arbitrarily small.
Beyond the tentative explanation given in [1] of why this undesirable feature
arises, we provide here a dynamic viewpoint:
Theorem 3 In the multiplicative model with q0 = 0, no equilibrium is possible
with any males’ strategy σ = ϕ♂(q) with a strictly increasing ϕ♂(·).
ProofWe may, without loss of generality, assume that ϕ♂(0) = 0, since any other
choice could lead to a translated signaling strategy conveying exactly the same
information but “cheaper” in terms of loss of viability.
Females’ behaviour and formula (7) (substituting σ to s) remain unchanged
from the additive model, but now F♂ = q(1 − σ)Nm(σ). We differentiate it with
respect to σ assuming χ(·) fixed and equal to ϕ♂(·). We write everything in terms
of r = q/q1. We obtain
dF♂
dσ
= K
[
1− σ
ϕ′
♂
− r(1− r)(1− r +
r2
3
)
]
.
3For both models, we also investigated the case where the limiting factor for the males is their
potential reproduction rate.
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We wish to allow for arbitrarily large, and if necessary infinite, slope for ϕ♂. One
way of achieving this will be to use its inverse function q = R(σ). Recalling that
r ≤ 1, we have
dF♂
dσ
> K(1− σ)
(
R′(σ)−
R(σ)
1− σ
)
.
The coefficient (1− σ) is always positive. Moreover, the function R is increasing.
It follows that ∫ ς
0
(
R′(σ)−
R(σ)
1− σ
)
dσ > R(ς)[1 + ln(1− ς)],
which is positive for ς < 1− e−1.
Hence, in every right neighborhood of σ = 0, there are σ values, and hence
also in any right neighborhood of q = 0 values of q, for which dF♂/dσ is strictly
positive. These individuals would therefore have an incentive to deviate from ϕ♂,
preventing the existence of an equilibrium.
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